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A major  nding of the Con ict Research Programme is that systemic corruption, a form of
transactional politics we call the ‘political marketplace’, tends to be associated with
exclusivist identity politics (racism, ethnic nationalism or religious fundamentalism). They
are almost always found together, even though they often operate in contradictory ways. In a
special issue of the journal Con ict, Security & Development, titled ‘Identity, Violence, and the
Political Marketplace’ edited by Mary Kaldor, Alex de Waal and Henry Radice, researchers
from across the CRP present new research that explores the logics of organised violence,
identity formation, war economies and political markets in the  ve countries of focus for the
programme: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan and Syria.
Iraqi Yazidi activists Nadia Murad and Lamiya Aji Bashar © European Union 2016 –
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Concepts and Conclusions
An introductory paper by Mary Kaldor and Alex de Waal, ‘Identity formation and the political
marketplace’, provides an analytic overview of the core concepts and an outline of how they
intersect, in the speci c contexts of our research countries. They note two key features of
contemporary politics discernible in each of the CRP’s  ve sites. The  rst is that of the
political market, in which power itself – public o ce, political allegiances and political
services – is bought and sold according to the laws of supply and demand. The second is
the increasing salience of political narratives that are framed around singular, binary and
 xed identities, or, as shorthand, ‘exclusivist identities’.
Kaldor and de Waal set out three core propositions about the relationship between identity
politics and the political marketplace, drawing on the special issue’s case studies for
evidentiary support.
1. Contemporary con icts are characterised by a speci c type of fragmented political
identities that are exclusivist, singular and make a claim to be  xed; a claim often endorsed
by international interventions, with the consequence of making them more rigid. These are
forms of identity that tend to be associated with steep gender hierarchies. These
fragmentary identity politics are constructed primarily through violence. Where other forms
of construction are more salient – education or media, for example – there are greater
possibilities for pluralism and  uidity. Violence dramatically upends power relations and
constructs new asymmetries of power, based on a combination of both its material and
identity capital gains.
2. Contemporary con icts are associated with what could be called the ‘disassembled state’,
following Saskia Sassen.  The disassembly of the state is the consequence of both the
functioning of the political marketplace, especially the instrumentalisation of different state
functions in pursuit of power and material resources, and the fragmentation of identity. This
happens as both transactional and identity politics trump rational-legal institutions and
social norms. As a result, contemporary wars should be seen as wars of disassembly rather
than of state-building.
3. External mediation and intervention  xes the relationship between fragmented identities
and the subunits of states that emerge from state disassembly. Contemporary peace
agreements typically do not end violence; rather they tend to provide a legalistic veneer to a
newly established set of power relations, based on the combination of disassembled
political units, fragmented identity and crony capitalist networks. These provide the core
components of the social condition that characterises contemporary con ict. While
normatively  xed, this con guration is constantly unstable – a ‘political unsettlement’ in the
words of Christine Bell and Jan Pospisil.
Civic actors in these con ict contexts are all aware of the pernicious implications arising
from the intersection of the political marketplace and identity politics. In recent years, the
slogans of democracy protesters in DRC, Sudan and Syria clearly show an awareness that
they are ranged against a toxic combination of corruption and the instrumentalisations of
identity. Meanwhile, certain political entrepreneurs and particular forms of political
organisation thrive under these conditions of turbulence and uncertainty. The body of work
offered by the CRP on this topic provides not only an insight into these realities and an
agenda for urgent research, but also a vocabulary and diagnostic for civic activists who are
pressing for alternatives to their current predicament.
Case studies
In ‘Violent con ict and ethnicity in the Congo: beyond materialism, primordialism and
symbolism’, Kasper Hoffmann, Koen Vlassenroot, Tatiana Carayannis and Godefroid Muzalia
argue that ethnicity is a de ning political resource both in the Congo’s politics and violent
con icts. The high political value of this ethnic capital is sustained by engrained discourses
and practices of ethnicity. These permeate the Congo’s political order, shape people’s
understanding of politics, con ict and political identities, and have contributed to the
formation of an unstable, centrifugal, and fragmentary political order. Conceptualising
ethnicity as capital dismantles the arti cial dualism between the symbolic realm of identities
and the material realm of the economy and suggests that what is at stake in this
competition is the distribution of symbolic and material resources. Hoffmann summarises
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some of these arguments in his blog ‘Ethnogovernmentality: The colonial legacy of the
nexus between ethnicity, territory and con ict‘.
Alex de Waal’s article on Somalia, ‘Somalia’s disassembled state: clan unit formation and the
political marketplace’, describes the trajectory from an aspiring modernist state, associated
with a Somali national identity, to a thoroughly ‘disassembled’ state driven by the twin
processes of identity unit formation and penetration of the political marketplace. As in the
Congo case, identity formation has its roots both in the colonial period and in the way that a
failing modernist state transformed some speci c lineage formations, commonly called
‘clans’, ‘into brokers of patronage, coopting them into [the] kleptocracy, and playing them off
against each other.’ But it was the violence of the 1987–92 period through which a ‘traumatic
and accelerated identity formation’ was produced, both by regime and rebel strategies, that
consolidated them as  xed territorial and political units. External efforts both invented and
rigidi ed the newly established divisions. In a recent blog, ‘Somalia’s Disassembled State’, de
Waal unpacks the implications of his analysis for the current political impasse in Somalia.
Naomi Pendle illustrates the uneasy relation between the political marketplace and
fragmented identity in South Sudan. Her piece, ‘The “Nuer of Dinka money” and the demands
of the dead: contesting the moral limits of monetised politics in South Sudan’ includes both
the story of the ‘Nuer weu’ and the debates about the meaning of money among the Nuer.
Pendle critiques explanations of South Sudan’s armed con icts since 2013 that have relied
on over-simpli ed theories of identity or monetised politics. She explores the renegotiation
of the meanings of monetary exchanges in politics and the interlinked remaking of political
identities. The remaking of identity and the moral limits of monetary gifts in politics cannot
only mobilise forces to war but also have implications for the moral limits of peace.
The article by Sami Hadaya, ‘Sectarianisation in Syria: the disintegration of a popular
struggle’, describes the step-by-step process of sectarianisation in the  rst few years of the
Syrian con ict. It involved rhetorical manipulation – the spread of rumours and the discourse
of fear through media as well as religious leaders and local notables. More importantly,
sectarianisation was ‘rei ed’ through the practice of violence – targeting of Sunni areas by
the regime, the establishment of ethnic militias, encouragement to loot selectively, and the
deliberate release from prison of Sala st  ghters. External states and private donors further
contributed to sectarian polarisation. The article quotes a woman from Harasta: ‘When they
saw they might receive money, they changed their names, their appearance, their symbols,
and speech’.
Zeynep Kaya addresses the gender dimension of the relationship between the political
marketplace and identity formation in ‘Sexual violence, identity and gender: ISIS and the
Yezidis’. She makes the critical argument that gender is a constitutive component of
violence and not tangential. She shows how gender norms are an essential part of singular
and exclusive identity formation using the extreme example of ISIS and its treatment of
Yazidi women. In the ISIS narrative, sexual slavery of the ‘other’ is justi ed since ‘the other’
(non-Muslims and non-People of the Book) are considered as ‘devil-worshippers’ or ‘mushrik’
(people who date from the period of ignorance about Islam). The construction of identity
through sexual violence took place within a socio-economic and political context and long-
term history, wherein gender and identity-based hierarchies intersected. This was possible
because of the existing repertoires of values, perceptions and practices of hegemonic and
militant masculinity. Some of these ideas are explored in Kaya’s blog ‘Coming to the verge of
destruction: Survival, change and engagement in the Yazidi community‘.
Finally, Jessica Watkins’ article, ‘Identity politics, elites and omnibalancing: reassessing Arab
Gulf state interventions in the Uprisings from the inside out’, points to the transnational
character of the relationship between the political marketplace and fragmented identity
formation. She provides a critique of the framings of regional relations in terms of ‘geo-
sectarianism’ or an ‘Arab Cold War’, suggesting that regional behaviour should be explained
in terms of calculations based upon a complex combination of domestic and regional
identity-based threats and opportunities related to the uprisings. The three critiques of the
‘geo-sectarian’ narrative is outlined in Watkins’ latest blog ‘Identity Politics, Elites and





Note: The CRP blogs gives the views of the author, not the position of the Con ict Research
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